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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the different sources of asymmetric price 
transmissions in the fuel market for France, Germany and Spain. During the last decades, 
the EU has carried out several common energy policies to achieve more efficient and 
competitive markets. However, given the specific characteristics of each country, the 
question we want to address is if fuel prices across EU members behave differently in 
response to different market structures. Oil operators have been targeted by competition 
authorities for conducting non-competitive practices. To figure out whether the common 
complaint that gasoline prices adjust differently to positive or negative input price 
changes, dynamic asymmetric models for the mean and variance are developed for each 
country. Several asymmetric specifications for the mean and variance are considered and 
the best specification combines double threshold error correction models (DT-ECM) for 
the mean with asymmetric EGARCH plus dummy variables for the conditional variance. 
We show that French gasoline prices behave more competitively, adjusting quicker to the 
long-run equilibrium and with higher price volatility. This outcome is consistent with the 
strong presence of hypermarkets following low-cost pricing strategies in France. 
Keywords: Competition, Gasoline Price Asymmetries, Rockets and Feathers, Nonlinear 
Error Correction, GARCH, EGARCH, GJR-GARCH, Log-GARCH. 
JEL classification: B23, C24, C52, D43, L13, L71. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition and pricing behaviour on retail gasoline markets is a highly debated topic 
among media, consumers, as well as regulatory and antitrust authorities in several 
countries around the world. There is a general consumer complaint that retail gasoline 
prices respond much faster to raises in wholesale prices than to reductions. Some authors 
determine that there is empirical evidence proving this price mechanism is truly present, 
rather than being a merely customers´ misperception (OECD, 2013).  
The asymmetric price transmission phenomenon has been observed in many markets. 
Under this price setting, commonly known as “rockets and feathers”, prices usually adjust 
much faster to input costs increases than to input costs decreases.  
These potential detrimental effects on consumers are what have drawn the attention of 
competition authorities in different countries. The Bundeskartellamt (German Antitrust 
Agency) studied the retail sale of gasoline and diesel at petrol stations in 2011 concluding 
that the German fuel sector is not truly competitive and that there is a dominant oligopoly 
in the regional petrol stations market (Bundeskartellamt, 2011). According to the 
Bundeskartellamt report, fuel prices are greater than they should be in a competitive 
equilibrium. It concludes the need for a persistent attention in this market and proposes 
to stop any future merger between large oil companies. With regard to the Spanish 
automotive sector, the CNMC2 expressed its concerns about the lack of competition in 
the gasoline market. In fact, the competition authority has fined Repsol, Cepsa and BP 
for price-fixing among petrol stations several times (CNMC, 2015). 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the presence of asymmetric price 
adjustments for the gasoline market. Thus, it will determine if there is empirical evidence 
supporting consumers´ thoughts that retail prices react quicker to input price rises or 
whether people pay more attention when prices increase. 
Firstly, this study presents an international comparison of gasoline price behaviour by 
employing recent weekly data from January 2011 until May 2017 for France, Germany 
and Spain.  
Secondly, the econometric methodology used to assess general price asymmetries 
consists on studying asymmetries from two main sources. On one hand, asymmetries in 
the mean through the double threshold error correction models (DT-ECM), introduced by 
Escribano and Torrado (2018) and on the other, with the asymmetric price patterns in the 
conditional variance by employing GARCH, EGARCH, GJR-GARCH and Log-GARCH 
models with dummy variables.  
In order to do that, Subsection 1.1 describes the characteristics of the countries under 
study. Section 2 summarizes previous literature about the “rockets and feathers” 
phenomenon. Section 3 attempts to explain the potential economic theory of price 
asymmetries. Section 4 describes the variables employed to develop the empirical 
methodology built in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents the main conclusions. 
                                                          
2 CNMC: Comisión Nacional de los mercados y la Competencia. 
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1.1. Countries under study 
Among all the countries within the European Union, France, Germany and Spain are the 
selected countries examined in this paper. The reason behind electing these three 
countries is explained below.  
France 
The main characteristic of the French gasoline market is the strong presence of gasoline 
stations belonging to hypermarkets and supermarkets. Supermarkets have been growing 
in size and in the range of products offered over the last fifty years in Europe. However, 
in the case of petrol stations, France is the pioneer. In the 1960s, the French Government 
imposed strict limits on the imported amount of gasoline, this pushed prices upwards. At 
this point, Carrefour realised that it could take advantage of its corporate structures and it 
would be able to import the fuel that oil companies were not. Therefore, Carrefour opened 
the continent´s first gasoline station attached to a supermarket in the 60s. The initial 
growth was slow, but over the next decades French hypermarkets captured nearly half of 
the retail market, forcing independent retailers to go bankruptcy (see Figure 1). 
Furthermore, in 2011, Total S.A., which is the current largest gas station operator in 
France, decided to follow the strategy of hypermarkets by creating a new chain, Total 
Access. Between 2011 and 2014, 600 petrol stations were rebranded and set more 
competitive prices (Chamayou, 2017). 
 
Figure 1: Number of Petrol Stations in France by Distribution Network 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data provided by Union Française des Industries Pétrolièrs (UFIP). 
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Germany 
The German automotive industry is one of the key pillars of its economy and according 
to the annual report of UPEi3, Germany is the EU country with the highest gasoline 
consumption (see Figure 2). Furthermore, it has a largely deregulated oil market. There 
are several companies operating along this vertically integrated market, including 
independents in the refining and the retail stages. The government does not own any of 
the companies operating downstream or upstream the oil sector (IEA, 2012). In spite of 
the fact of being characterized as a deregulated market, the Bundeskartellamt stated that 
the German fuel sector was not truly competitive in 2011. 
Figure 2: Gasoline Consumption 2014 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on  the Comité Professionnel du Pétrole and BAFA reports. Note. The units 
of consumption are kt (1 kt = 1 000 000 kg). 
Spain 
In comparison to other European countries, the Spanish liberalization process of the 
gasoline market took more time. During the 1927-1992 period, the government 
monopoly, which was CAMPSA4, was in charge of operating the petrol market.  This 
public monopoly was vertically integrated, from the upstream segment till the final 
settlement of retail prices following the orders from the national government. In 1985, 
there were 0,93 petrol stations per 100 km in Spain, while that number was 6,4 in France 
and 22 in the Netherlands (Correljé, 1994). From 1985 onwards, the market suffered from 
a liberalization process in which new private market operators emerged.  
Over the last years, the number of petrol stations has been growing in Spain (see Figure 
3: Number of Petrol Stations in Spain by Market Operators. The majority of market operators are 
still vertically integrated (Repsol, Cepsa and BP) and present in the refinery process. The 
amount of vertically integrated petrol stations together with other branded petrol stations 
                                                          
3 UPEi is the association of European independent fuel suppliers. 
4 CAMPSA: Compañía Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petróleos Sociedad Anónima. 
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have been almost constant from 2011 until 2017, while the number of independent 
operators has increased (CNMC, 2019). 
Figure 3: Number of Petrol Stations in Spain by Market Operators 
 
Source: Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC). 
 
2. Literature Review 
Prior to the development of an empirical model to determine whether price asymmetries 
exist for the three countries under study, it is crucial to examine what previous literature 
have found regarding the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon. Different studies in the 
gasoline market generally differ in the following aspects: the period under scrutiny, the 
country involved, the frequency of the data and the empirical nonlinear model (Table 1). 
The most common methodology when tackling the presence of the rockets and feathers 
is to study the asymmetries in the mean using the types of Nonlinear Error Correction 
Model (ECM) introduced by Escribano (1986, 1987, 2004) and extended in Escribano 
and Granger (1998) and Escribano and Pfann (1998). One of the pioneering works in this 
field is the one of Bacon (1991) with ex-Rotterdam spot prices in the UK market, finding 
quicker adjustments to the equilibrium if oil prices are rising. Manning´s (1991) research 
look at UK retail prices rather than spot prices. He founds non-persistent asymmetry for 
the 1973-1988 period.   
Lanza (1991) addresses the German market during 1980-1990 period and distinguishes 
two stages of the price formation mechanism. Additional studies for Germany were 
conducted by Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992). The authors consider two different 
periods, i) 1972-1980 and ii) 1980-1989. The asymmetries are only allowed for the short 
run dynamics. The results show asymmetries for the former period, but no asymmetries 
in the latter. 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
2011 2013 2015 2017
Vertically integrated petrol stations
Independent petrol stations
Other branded petrol stations
 5 
 
Duffy-Deno (1996) find asymmetries in the US fuel sector applying an ECM to weekly 
data during 1989-1993. The focus of Borenstein at al. (1997) is again on the US for the 
1986-1990 period. The study confirms that prices react more rapidly when crude oil prices 
are increasing rather than decreasing. More concretely, it only takes 4 weeks to return to 
the long-run equilibrium prices when there is a positive oil shock. However, when the 
shock is negative 8 weeks are required.  The UK market is revisited by Reilly and Witt 
(1998) with monthly data from 1982 till 1995 focusing on possible asymmetries driven 
by the $/£ exchange rate and by crude oil price changes. Galeotti et al. (2003) study the 
adjustments of the retail gasoline prices to crude oil price shocks for France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the UK. The main contribution of this paper is the country-comparison 
employing a two-stage approach for the price transmission mechanisms. These different 
stages allow them to figure out whether asymmetries occur at the refinery level or at the 
distribution stage. The methodology applied consists on an ECM and bootstrapping on 
monthly data for 1985-2000 period. The study concludes with symmetric responses in the 
case of Germany, U.K. and Italy and asymmetric behaviour for France and Spain. Grasso 
and Manera (2007) offer an international perspective as well by studying the same five 
countries, but employing different ECM models for 1985-2003. Under this study 
asymmetries depend on the country and on the model used. Short-run asymmetries are 
easily supported when the TAR-ECM5 model is applied in comparison to the asymmetric 
ECM. Hannan and Berger (1991) show how deposit rates behave more rigidly when the 
stimulus for a deposit rate change is upward than downward. Furthermore, Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992) proves that it is in concentrated markets, where interest rates on deposits 
raise slower in response to increases on market interest rates than to a decrease. An 
alternative methodology is to study the asymmetric behaviour in the variance through 
GARCH or EGARCH models. Bettendorf et al. (2009) analysed the Dutch retail gasoline 
market by applying an Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model for 1996-2004. 
The Spanish case has been studied by Cotín-Pillart (2008) in two different periods: 
i)1993-1998 and ii)1998-2005. Regarding the first period, changes in spot gasoline prices 
are symmetrically transmitted to retail prices. However, asymmetric responses arise in 
the second period. More general price nonlinearities in mean are considered by the use of 
the nonlinear error correction models of Escribano (1985, 1986, 1987 and 2004), 
Escribano and Granger(1998) and Escribano and Pfann (2998), by jointly relating the 
nonlinearity in the ECM to the increases or decrease in the international oil price (rockets 
and feathers hypothesis). In particular Escribano and Torrado (2018) consider a nonlinear 
three-dimensional logistic-ECM models (Double threshold-ECM). The main goal of this 
paper is to study the international reactions in retail European prices to changes in the 
prices of oil with a joint estimation of the asymmetry parameters of the conditional mean, 
using Double Threshold-ECM models, and allowing also for asymmetries in their 
conditional variance.  
                                                          
5 TAR-ECM refers to the Threshold Autoregressive Error Correction Model.. 
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Table 1: Summary Literature Review 
Study Country Period Data Frequency Model  Conclusion 
Bacon (1991) GB 1982-1989 Biweekly ECM Asymmetries 
Lanza (1991) DE 1980-1990 Monthly ECM Asymmetries 
Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992) DE 1972-1989 Monthly ECM with short-run asymmetries 
Short-run asymmetries during 1972-1980 
No asymmetries during 1980-1990 
Duffy-Deno (1996) US 1989-1993 Weekly ECM Asymmetries 
Reilly and Witt (1998) GB 1982-1995 Monthly ECM with short-run asymmetries Asymmetries 
Borenstein et al. (1997) US 1986-1992 Biweekly ECM Asymmetries 
Asplund et al. (2000) SE 1980-1996 Monthly ECM with short-run asymmetries Short-run asymmetries 
Godby et al. (2000) CA 1990-1996 Weekly ECM Symmetric behaviour 
Salas (2002) PH 1999-2002 Weekly Ordered Probit, PAM and VECM Asymmetries 
Galeotti et al. (2003) 
DE, ES, FR, 
GB and IT  
1985-2000 Monthly ECM Asymmetries 
Grasso and Manera (2007) 
DE, ES, FR, 
GB and IT  
1985-2003 Monthly ECM, Threashold ECM and TAR-ECM 
Symmetries/asymmetries depending on de model 
and the country 
Cotín-Pilart et al. (2008) SP 1993-2005 Weekly ECM Symmetries/asymmetries depending on the period 
Balmaceda and Soruco (2008) CL 2001-2004 Weekly ECM Asymmetries 
Bettendorf et al. (2009) NL 1996-2004 Daily ECM and EGARCH Short-run asymmetries 
Polemis (2012) GR 1988-2006 Monthly ECM with short-run asymmetries Short-run and long-run asymmetries 
Asane-Otoo and Schneider (2015) DE 2003-2013 Daily and Weekly ECM Asymmetries and symmetries 
Qin et al. (2016) US 1993-2012 Weekly ECM 
Asymmetries via commodity and financial 
markets. 
Mann (2016) US 2008-2011 Daily Threshold ECM and GJR-GARCH Rejects the rockets and feathers phenomenon. 
Chua et al. (2017) AU 2007-2014 Daily and Weekly Threshold ECM, GARCH and GJR  
Asymmetries found only in 4/28 retail gas 
stations. 
Cook and Fosten (2018) US and NZ 
1985-1998 
2004-2017 
Daily and Weekly ECM and NARDL Asymmetries 
Escribano and Torrado (2018) SP 2011-2016 weekly DT-ECM, LOGISTIC Asymmetries 
Source: Own elaboration.   
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3. Economic Theory under Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT) 
Asymmetric price transmission (APT) has been a subject of considerable attention in 
different markets. First, because APT may point out to the existence of gaps in economic 
theory (Peltzman, 2000). Second, APT may have substantial welfare and policy 
implications. Asymmetric price transmission implies that either buyers are not benefiting 
from input price falls or sellers are not raising their prices when input costs increase in 
comparison with a symmetric situation (Meyer and Cramon‐Taubadel, 2004). It alters the 
size and timing of the welfare changes associated to price rises or price falls.  
With an extensive number of studies showing that downstream gasoline prices react more 
quickly to crude oil price increases than to decreases, economists have proposed 
numerous explanations for this price behaviour. Consumer search costs, market power, 
inventory management, accounting practices or the behaviour of mark-ups over business 
cycles are just examples of it (Brown and Yucel, 2000). 
3.1. Consumer Search Costs 
According to Borenstein (1991) and Peltzman (2000), consumer search costs are one of 
the causes of the asymmetric response. Given the homogeneity of gasoline, the main 
element that differentiate filling stations is their location. Each petrol station enjoys a 
locational monopoly, which is limited by consumer search. Consumers search costs are 
defined as the energy, time and money spent by customers when they look for a product.  
On the one hand, when wholesale gasoline prices increase, the owner of each petrol 
station tries to maintain his profit margins by rapidly passing the rise to customers. On 
the other hand, if wholesale prices decrease, each petrol station slowly passes the decrease 
to consumers.  
Furthermore, there is another point that should be considered. It is common that the costs 
associated to an intense search are much higher for most customers that the corresponding 
cost savings from finding a cheaper price. Thus, the time spent and the transport costs 
arising from reaching the cheapest petrol station are probably much larger than the money 
saved. Imperfect consumer information together with the existence of travel costs 
generate market power (Lewis, 2011). 
3.2. Market Power: Anti-competitive practices like tacit collusion 
The majority of APT publications explain asymmetries through non-competitive market 
structures. Market power is plausibly the main concern of those who find out that gasoline 
prices react more rapidly to oil price increases than to falls. The abuse of market power 
could lead to collusion and, in that case, competition authorities should be concern about 
it. According to Article 101 TFEU, all agreements between companies and concerted 
practices that affect competition between MS6 by directly or indirectly fixing prices, 
should be forbidden.  
Brown and Yücel (2000) and Balke et al. (1998) point out that APT can arise when 
oligopolistic firms engage in tacit (unspoken) collusion to maintain higher margins.  
                                                          
6 MS: Member States. 
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The main factors that facilitate collusion are: high concentration, the existence of barriers 
to entry, cross ownership, multimarket contact, the homogeneity of products and having 
stable markets (Motta, 2004). In the case of the gasoline market, based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)7, the market is more concentrated in Spain and Germany than in 
France (see Table 2). According to the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, a market with a HHI above 1800 is 
highly concentrated. Therefore, as Germany and Spain are close to this value, they can be 
stated that these markets are concentrated while France is not.  
Table 2: Market Shares (Share of Petrol Stations in %)  
 
Note. It shows the market shares for France and Spain in 2015 and 2012 for Germany. Source: Own 
calculation based on UFIP (Union Française des Industries Pétrolières), Energie Informations Dienst 
(EID) and Asociación Española de Operadores de Productos Petrolíferos (AOP).  
 
Several market operators are vertically integrated across the supply and distribution chain 
(see Figure 4). Furthermore, gasoline is a homogeneous and inelastic product, where the 
main difference resides on location or services offered (shops and/or restaurants). 
According to the Lerner index8, the fact that gasoline demand is inelastic may allow oil 
companies to increase prices without losing a large proportion of their customers. 
Price transparency plays a dual role. On the one hand, having transparent markets allows 
consumers to choose the petrol station with the lowest prices, what increases competition. 
On the other hand, transparency helps to sustain collusion, signalling when competitors 
are deviating from the collusive equilibrium. French, German and Spanish gas stations 
have the obligation to provide their daily gasoline prices to the corresponding institution 
in each country. That institution (DGCCRF9 for France10, Bundeskartellamt for 
                                                          
7 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ (
𝑞𝑖
𝑄
)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1 , being 𝑞𝑖 the quantity sold by company “𝑖”  and Q, the total quantity in the 
market. 
8 The Lerner index (𝐿) under Cournot Competition is defined as follows: 𝐿𝑖 =
𝑝−𝑐𝑖
𝑝
=
𝑠𝑖
𝜀
, being 𝜀 the demand 
elasticity and 𝑠𝑖, the market share of company “𝑖”.  
9 DGCCRF: Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes.  
10 The petrol stations distributing more than 500 𝑚3 have the obligation to inform their real-time prices.  
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Germany11 and Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo for Spain) is the one in 
charge of publicly publish this information.  
Figure 4: Market Structure 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Besides the structural analysis of the market, it is crucial to look at behavioural indicators 
that help antitrust authorities to figure out whether collusive practices are present in the 
market or not. This is what Section 5 will develop. 
3.3. Adjustment Costs and Menu Costs 
Apart from consumer search costs and market power, there are other explanations for the 
asymmetries found in gasoline markets. Inventory management, accounting practices12 
and refinery adjustment costs are just examples of these alternative views. If these costs 
are asymmetric to increases or decreases in prices and/or quantities, APT may arise. 
For instance, oil companies may view the effect of unexpected changes on their short-run 
costs inventories as asymmetric (Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert, 1997).  If operational 
costs are increasing when inventories are below normal operating levels and the upstream 
firm decreases its supply, gasoline prices sharply increase to prevent a loss of inventory. 
At the same time, a raise in inventories above the normal operating level has a small effect 
on costs, the company may reduce its selling prices at a lower speed when it suffers an 
increase in upstream supply.  
 
                                                          
11 The Bundeskartellamt proposed a new digital price comparison system in which consumers can access 
price information to find its cheaper alternative.  
12 Balke et al. (1998) stated that accounting methods like FIFO can lead to APT. 
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4. Data  
With the aim of studying the potential asymmetric price behaviour in the EU fuel market, 
weekly data from January 2011 until May 2017 is employed, which involves 335 
observations.  
As the rockets and feathers phenomenon studies the behaviour of downstream prices with 
respect to changes in upstream prices, we need input and output prices. The variable used 
as an input price is the crude oil price (𝐶𝑅). In the European market the reference price 
for crude oil is given by the Brent Spot Price FOB13 ($/𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙) obtained from the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). As the price is in $, the €/$ exchange rate (𝐸𝑅) 
is required. In this case, the exchange rate has been retrieved from the European Central 
Bank. For upstream prices, the variables applied are the pre-tax retail price of 95 octane 
gasoline for France (𝑅𝐹), Germany (𝑅𝐺) and Spain (𝑅𝑆). The pre-tax retail prices are an 
average of the 95 octane gasoline prices (€/1000𝐿) provided by the Weekly Oil Bulletin. 
These three variables are transformed into €/1L (see descriptive statistics in Table A-1 of 
Appendix A). Variables in capital letters represent the series in levels and the lowercase 
letters refer to the series in logarithms (𝑐𝑟, 𝑒𝑟, 𝑟𝑓, 𝑟𝑔and 𝑟𝑠).  
According to economic theory, the difference between retail and crude oil prices is the 
margin obtained by the firms operating in the industry. Figure 5 shows the relationship 
between retail gasoline prices for Spain, Germany and France. As it can be seen, the 
Spanish pre-tax gasoline prices are above German and French prices. This difference 
across countries has been exacerbated since 2013. Thus, Spanish oil companies may be 
obtaining higher margins than those achieved in Germany or France.  
 
Figure 5: Variables Representation in Logarithms 
 
Source. Own elaboration. It is likely that series are cointegrated since they move together over time. 
 
                                                          
13 FOB: Free On Board. The FOB type contract specified that the price quoted by a certain seller includes 
all charges related to placing the products on board at the port of departure established by the buyer. 
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5. Model Specification and Empirical Results 
As explained in Section 2, most of studies dealing with the rockets and feather 
phenomenon employ an Error Correction Model (ECM) methodology given the existing 
cointegration between input and output prices. Subsection 5.1 studies how retail gasoline 
prices behave when modelled under symmetric specifications. Then, asymmetries in 
mean and in variance are allowed in Subsection 5.2. 
 
5.1. Linear and Symmetric Models 
When dealing with ECM models, it is important to examine the order of integration of 
the series. Table 3 shows the results of using ADF tests for unit roots and it is found that 
all log-variables are integrated of order one, I(1), as expected. Furthermore, from the 
results of Table 3, it can be rejected that oil prices are I(2). Thus, all prices and the 
exchange rate are I(1). 
 
Given that all variables are integrated of order one and applying the Granger´s 
representation theorem, there might be linear combinations of the series that are 
stationary, I(0) (Engle and Granger, 1987). As the variables are non-stationary in levels, 
the Johansen Cointegration test is performed to verify if there is more than one long-run 
relationship between retail gasoline prices, the exchange rate and crude oil prices. The 
results of the test are reported in Table 4. The trace statistic confirms the existence of one 
cointegrating relation for each of the three countries under study.  
 
Table 3: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test 
 
Note. The general expression of the ADF test is given by the following formula, ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 +
𝑎𝑡  . The ADF checks the order of integration of the variables where the three null hypotheses test for 
(𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0) under different parametric specifications: (i): with intercept and trend; (ii): with intercept only 
and (iii): without intercept and trend. In all the cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root 
according to the MacKinnon´s critical values with a non-significant trend and intercept.  
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Table 4: Johansen (1991) Cointegration Test 
 
Note. The trace yield to the same results for the 3 countries, one cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level. 
 
Equation (1) represents the cointegrating relationship in which the dependent variable, 
the logarithm of retail gasoline price of France, Germany and Spain (𝑟𝑓𝑡, 𝑟𝑔𝑡, and 𝑟𝑠𝑡) is 
explained by the logarithm of crude oil prices (𝑐𝑟𝑡) and the logarithm of the exchange rate 
(𝑒𝑟𝑡). This long-run equilibrium is estimated by Fully Modified Least Squares (FM-OLS). 
Then, to figure out if there is a linear combination of prices I(0), an ADF test is performed 
on the residuals (𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑓𝑡, 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑡and 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡) arising from  Equation (1). The results show that 
residuals are stationary, confirming that variables are cointegrated (see Table 5).  
Long-run equilibrium (cointegrating equation): 
 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
Table 5: FM-OLS Cointegrating Relationships 
 
Note. “***”, “**” and “*” represent significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The Engle-
Granger test refers to the ADF tests performed over the residuals from the cointegrating relationship for 
each country. As the null is rejected, residuals are I(0) and cointegration exists. 
 
Equation (2) represents the traditional ECM under which the first difference of retail 
gasoline prices is explained by the error correction term derived from Equation (1), the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of crude oil prices and exchange rate plus the lags 
of the dependent variable, which is the retail price of gasoline.  
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In order to know if conditional variance models can be employed, the ARCH test is 
performed14. Given the presence of heteroscedasticity in the series (see Figure B-1 in 
Appendix B), generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) is 
employed15 to get consistent and efficient estimates. A GARCH(1,1) model is applied 
over the residuals from Equation (2), 𝜖𝑖𝑡, which are distributed with mean cero and 
variance 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 . The GARCH(1,1) model allows the conditional variance to be explained as 
an ARMA process as shown in Equation (3). 
 
Error Correction Model (ECM): 
 
∆𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝛾ℎ∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−ℎ
𝑘
ℎ=0
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑙∆𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1
+ 𝛽𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
 
 𝜖𝑖𝑡 /𝐼𝑡−1~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2)  
GARCH (1,1):                
 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2  (3) 
Table 6 reports the ECM estimates corrected for heteroscedasticity through a 
GARCH(1,1) specification. According to the literature regarding Error Correction 
Models, the coefficient of the error correction term of Equation (2) indicates the velocity 
of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium model. Thus, France recovers the long-
run equilibrium faster than Germany and Spain.  
Table 6: ECM Estimates 
 France Germany Spain 
Linear terms 
𝑐 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 0.170*** 0.110*** 0.266*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−2 0.144*** 0.170*** -0.015 
∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 - -0.103* - 
∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 0.131* - - 
∆𝑟𝑡−1 0.112*** 0.242*** 0.302*** 
∆𝑟𝑡−2 - 0.098** - 
Error Correction terms 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 -0.112*** -0.081*** -0.104*** 
Variance equation 
 GARCH GARCH GARCH 
𝑐 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2  0.226*** 0.252*** 0.565*** 
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2  0.678*** 0.615*** -0.119** 
Goodness of fit and specification tests 
AIC -5.394 -6.096 -5.668 
BIC -5.291 -5.979 -5.565 
HQ -5.353 -6.054 -5.627 
Ljung-Box Q test 13.362 7.026 12.088 
𝑅2 0.437 0.592 0.488 
Note. “***”, “**” and “*” stand for significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The ”–” 
represent the absence of those variables in some of the models. Those terms where omitted following the 
values of the information criteria. The Ljung–Box Q test confirms the lack of autocorrelation (8 lags 
employed). 
                                                          
14 This test is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in 
the residuals (Engle, 1982). As the p-value=0.009, the null of homoskedasticity is rejected. 
15 The ARCH model was introduced by Robert F. Engle in 1982 and the GARCH by T. Bollerslev (1986). 
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Measuring the Adjustment towards the Equilibrium across Countries 
Given the estimates from Table 6, the focus is placed on how the pass-through pricing is 
translated into consumers depending on the country. Figure 6 portrays the number of 
weeks required to close the gap between current and equilibrium prices. These values are 
computed by applying the approach of Galeotti et al. (2003) of Equation (4). The 
“𝑥” refers to the gap between current and equilibrium prices that is reverted once the 
disequilibrium arises. This “𝑥”  is defined by “𝑝𝑡”, which is the current price, “𝑝𝑡
∗”, which 
represents the long-run (equilibrium) price and “𝑝0”, which is the initial price. The 
denominator contains the “𝛽 ” parameter, showing the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium and it is given by the coefficient of the error correction term 
appearing in Equation (2).  
 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 =
ln (
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
∗
𝑝0 − 𝑝𝑡
∗)
𝛽
=  
ln (1 − 𝑥)
𝛽
 
(4) 
 
As it is shown in Figure 6, the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is quicker in France 
than in Spain or Germany. This result, obviously, coincides with the highest speed found 
for France in Table 6. The reason behind a more rapid readjustment to equilibrium may 
be due to the more competitive market structure for the retail gasoline industry in France. 
For instance, in the case of the ECM in France, it takes 10.316 weeks to close the gap 
between current and long-run equilibrium prices by 70%, while 13.728 weeks are 
required for Germany and 11.283 for Spain (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: GARCH ECM Adjustments to the Long-Run Equilibrium 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on the ECM estimates. 
 
5.2. Non-linear and Asymmetric Models: Asymmetric Error Correction Model  
To capture the potential price asymmetries existing in the retail gasoline market, the 
specification departures from the ECM described in Equation (2). The difference is that 
it splits the error correction term in two terms (𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ and 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
−), where 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ = 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑓𝑡 ≥ 0, 
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𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡 ≥ 0 and 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
− = 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑓𝑡 < 0, 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑡 < 0, 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡 < 0. This is the base for 
the Asymmetric Error Correction Model (A-ECM) and it is the classical model applied 
when studying long-run asymmetries in the mean (see Equation (5)).  
 
The main advantage of the EGARCH model is the logarithmic specification, which 
relaxes the positive restriction among the parameters. Another advantage is the 
incorporation of asymmetries. The asymmetric response is introduced by the term 𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
. 
When there is a negative shock, the impact on the logarithm of the conditional variance 
is 𝛼1 − 𝛾1. However, when the shock is positive, the effect is 𝛼1 + 𝛾1. The difference with 
traditional variance models is that an additional regressor is included, 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡. This 
explanatory variable is a dummy variable, representing when crude oil prices are 
increasing 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 if ∆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≥ 0) or decreasing (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡 = 1 if ∆𝑐𝑟𝑡 < 0).  
 
Asymmetric Error Correction Model (A-ECM): 
 
∆𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝛾ℎ∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−ℎ
𝑘
ℎ=0
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑙∆𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1
+ 𝛽+𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽−𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
− + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(5) 
 
 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2)  
 
GARCH (1,1) with dumcrpos: 
               
 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝜆+𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (6) 
 
EGARCH (1,1) with dumcrpos: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 |
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
| + 𝛾1
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜑1𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝜆+𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (7) 
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Table 7: Asymmetries in mean and variance 
 France Germany Spain 
Linear terms in the mean 
𝑐 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 0.140*** 0.182*** 0.190*** 0.081*** 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.257*** 0.270*** 0.283*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−2 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.132*** -0.159*** 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.066** -0.022 -0.007 
∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 - - - -0.146** -0.105* -0.117** - - - 
∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 0.156* 0.132* 0.117* - - - - - - 
∆𝑟𝑡−1 0.117** 0.134* 0.145*** 0.181*** 0.237*** 0.260*** 0.113** 0.317*** 0.243*** 
∆𝑟𝑡−2 - - - 0.146** 0.100** 0.095 - - - 
Asymmetric ECM terms in the mean 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
+  -0.099** -0.076* -0.067* -0.088*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.119*** -0.142*** -0.138*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
−  -0.177** -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.130*** -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.098*** -0.078** -0.083** 
Asymmetries in the conditional variance 
  𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝑐 - 0.000*** -2.608*** - 0.000*** -1.981*** - 0.000*** -8.727*** 
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2  - 0.288*** - - 0.257*** - - 0.601*** - 
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2  - 0.572*** - - 0.588*** - - -0.112** - 
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
 - - -0.063 - - -0.060 - - 0.008 
|
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
| - - 0.548*** - - 0.463*** - - 0.749*** 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) - - 0.715*** - - 0.807*** - - 0.022 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 - -0.000*** -0.385*** - -0.000** -0.226*** - -0.000** -0.479*** 
Goodness of fit and specification tests 
AIC -5.330 -5.406 -5.426 -5.990 -6.101 -6.115 -5.570 -5.667 -5.671 
BIC -5.250 -5.280 -5.289 -5.898 -5.963 -5.966 -5.501 -5.554 -5.545 
HQ -5.298 -5.356 -5.371 -5.953 -6.045 -6.056 -5.542 -5.623 -5.621 
Ljung-Box Q test 11.223 12.247 12.368 4.600 6.244 5.905 6.810 14.345 10.494 
𝑅2 0.442 0.437 0.435 0.597 0.590 0.590 0.509 0.484 0.496 
          
Note. “***”, “**” and “*” stand for significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The ”–” represent the absence of those variables in some of the models. Those 
terms where omitted following the values of the information criteria. The Ljung–Box Q test confirms the lack of autocorrelation (8 lags employed).
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The estimates of Equations (5)-(7) for France, Germany and Spain are presented in Table 
716.  According to Granger and Lee (1989), the first step when looking for asymmetries 
is that the coefficients associated to them should be individually significant.  
Notice that once we allow also for asymmetries in the variance, the nonlinearities in the 
mean changes. See for example the different nonlinearities found in oil prices for Spain 
in Escribano and Torrado (2018). The F-statistics for the potential asymmetries derived 
from the A-ECM. Under the null (𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
+ = 𝛽𝑖
−), the velocity of adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium is the same independently on whether prices are overestimated or 
underestimated. Therefore, according to the traditional asymmetric error correction 
model, there are no long-run asymmetries in any country.  
 
Double-Threshold Error Correction Model 
Instead of allowing for single type of asymmetries in the mean with the traditional A-
ECM, we consider the Double-Threshold Error Correction Model (DT-ECM) for the 
mean, following Escribano and Torrado (2018), and we extend it here to allow for 
asymmetries also in the conditional variance. Under this method, asymmetries in the 
mean are arising from positive or negative input (oil) price changes are considered, 
together with whether prices are above or below their long run-equilibrium levels. 
Interactions between crude oil dummy variables and the error correction terms are used 
to gain more flexibility (𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡, 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
− ∗
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 and  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
− ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡). Besides this non-linear specification, linear 
short-run dynamics are included as with the ECM and the A-ECM, following the same 
criteria. The functional form of the DT-ECM is shown in Equation (8).  
Furthermore, to control for conditional heteroscedasticity, apart from employing GARCH 
(1,1), EGARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) we consider asymmetric Log-GARCH(1,1) 
models, see Equation (9) and Equation (10) respectively. GJR-GARCH model was 
introduced by Glosten et al. (1993) with the aim of capturing asymmetries between 
positive and negative shocks on the variance. As it is shown in Equation (9), the 
difference with the GARCH model resides on the 𝐼𝑡−1 term, which is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 when the shock is negative (𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 < 0). When 𝛼3 is positive and 
statistically significant, the leverage effect is present. Besides the GJR-GARCH models, 
Log-GARCH models have proved to be an interesting class of models for the conditional 
variance that allow us to include additional explanatory variables while guarantying that 
the estimated variance is positive, see for example Sucarrat and Escribano (2018) and 
Sucarrat et al (2018). This model has been especially useful when studying electricity 
prices see Escribano and Sucarrat (2018). A further advantage of using Log-GARCH 
models is that it is robust to jumps and spikes, which explains part of variance dynamics, 
without imposing restrictive positivity constraints in the parameters.   
Double-Threshold Error Correction Model (DT-ECM): 
                                                          
16 Engle (1982) showed that it is possible to simultaneously estimate the mean and the variance of a certain 
series.  
 
 18 
 
 ∆𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝛾ℎ∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−ℎ
𝑘
ℎ=0
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑙∆𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1
+ 𝛽++𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽
+−𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+
∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽
−+𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
− ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽
−−𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
− ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(8) 
 
 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2)  
 
GJR-GARCH (1,1) with dumcrpos: 
 
 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼3𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 
2 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜆
+𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (9) 
Log-GARCH (1,1) with dumcrpos: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1log (𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝜑1𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝜆+𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (10) 
The estimates of Equations (6)-(10) for France, Germany and Spain are presented in 
Table 9 and Table 11. Under the DT-ECM, two aspects are taken into account, the sign 
of the error correction term and the dummy variable of crude oil prices, indicating whether 
input prices increase or decrease. Interestingly, in 100% of the cases, the coefficients 
associated to 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠 are greater than those related to 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔. Thus, the speed of 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is higher when oil prices are rising than 
when they are falling for France, Germany and Spain. Furthermore, in 67% of the cases, 
the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is faster when the error correction term is 
below the equilibrium level.  
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Table 9: DT-ECM in the mean with asymmetries in the conditional variance 
 France Germany Spain 
Linear terms in the conditional mean 
𝑐 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 0.137*** 0.180*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.080*** 0.120*** 0.106*** 0.131*** 0.257*** 0.264*** 0.267*** 0.263*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑡−2 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.141*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.092*** 0.110*** 
∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 - - - - -0.158** -0.113** -0.127** -0.111** - - - - 
∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 0.150* 0.122* 0.119* 0.147* - - - - - - - - 
∆𝑟𝑡−1 0.111* 0.129*** 0.160*** 0.171*** 0.187*** 0.276*** 0.254*** 0.321*** - - - - 
∆𝑟𝑡−2 - - - - 0.139** 0.065 0.091* 0.038 0.106*** 0.060 0.060 0.058 
Nonlinear and asymmetric terms in the conditional mean 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
+ ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠 -0.106* -0.113** -0.125*** -0.097*** -0.118*** -0.108*** -0.104*** -0.092*** -0.134** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.138*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
+ ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔 -0.098** -0.060 -0.057 -0.053 -0.075*** -0.044* -0.050* -0.030 -0.098** -0.094** -0.087** -0.096** 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
− ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠 -0.202*** -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.173*** -0.158*** -0.121*** -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.129*** -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.119*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
− ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑔 -0.138** -0.102* -0.091 -0.080 -0.078 -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.069** -0.060 -0.050 -0.063 -0.051 
Conditional variance 
  𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯 
+dumcrpos 
𝐺𝐽𝑅 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯 
+dumcrpos 
𝐺𝐽𝑅 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯 
+dumcrpos 
𝐺𝐽𝑅 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 
+dumcrpos 
𝑐 - 0.000*** -3.842*** 0.000*** - 0.000*** -2.104*** 0.000*** - 0.000*** -4.740*** 0.000*** 
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2  - 0.300*** - -0.013 - 0.300*** - 0.095 - 0.193*** - 0.255*** 
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2  - 0.566*** - -0.006 - 0.396*** - 0.140 - 0.426*** - 0.489*** 
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
 - - -0.132* - - - -0.098 - - - 0.006 - 
|
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
| - - 0.588*** - - - 0.479*** - - - 0.443*** - 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) - - 0.567*** - - - 0.795*** - - - 0.457*** - 
𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 
2 𝐼𝑡−1 - - - 0.502*** - - - 0.499** - - - -0.104 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 - -0.000** -0.425** -0.000*** - -0.000* -0.223** -0.000*** - -0.000** -0.498*** -0.000*** 
Goodness of fit and specification tests 
AIC -5.321 -5.400 -5.421 -5.402 -5.993 -6.102 -6.116 -6.112 -5.573 -5.627 -5.631 -5.623 
BIC -5.218 -5.251 -5.260 -5.242 -5.879 -5.942 -5.956 -5.940 -5.482 -5.489 -5.482 -5.474 
HQ -5.280 -5.341 -5.357 -5.338 -5.948 -6.038 -6.052 -6.043 -5.537 -5.572 -5.571 -5.563 
Ljung-Box Q test 11.611 12.627 8.185 14.724 5.012 4.400 3.851 3.454 5.250 4.515 5.379 4.779 
𝑅2 0.444 0.438 0.432 0.431 0.603 0.592 0.595 0.583 0.517 0.514 0.514 0.513 
             
Note. “***”, “**” and “*” stand for significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The ”–” represent the absence of those variables in some of the models. Those 
terms where omitted following the values of the information criteria. The Ljung–Box Q test confirms the lack of autocorrelation (8 lags employed). 
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As individual significance it is not enough to determine the presence of an asymmetric 
behaviour, F-tests are performed to analyse whether the coefficients of the error 
correction terms statistically diverge. Table 10 shows the F-statistics for the potential 
long-run asymmetries derived from the DT-ECM. Under the nulls 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
++ = 𝛽𝑖
+−and 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
−+ = 𝛽𝑖
−−, the velocity of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is the same 
independently on whether crude oil prices are rising or falling. Furthermore, under the 
nulls 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
++ = 𝛽𝑖
−+and 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
+− = 𝛽𝑖
−−, there is a symmetric adjustment when prices 
are overestimated or underestimated independently of the price change of crude oil.  
From the F-tests of Table 9 and the magnitude of the coefficients associated to the error 
correction terms of Table 10, certain conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, as the p-values 
are greater than 5% for the four tests in France, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, no long-run mean asymmetries are present in this country. Secondly, in Spain 
and Germany, the null 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
−+ = 𝛽𝑖
−− can be rejected at a 1% significance level. This 
implies that whenever retail gasoline prices for these two countries are below the 
equilibrium level, the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is much faster whenever 
crude oil prices raise (𝛽𝑖
−+ > 𝛽𝑖
−−). Thirdly, Spain presents another type of asymmetry, 
𝛽𝑠
+− > 𝛽𝑠
−−. When crude oil prices are decreasing, Spanish retail gasoline prices adjust 
quicker when they are above the long-run relationship. The asymmetries found for Spain 
and Germany may be explained by the economic theories shown in Section 3, like the 
presence of consumer search costs or the existence of market power.  
Table 10: F-statistics for DT-ECM Asymmetries 
 
Note. The first sign in the 𝛽 superscript determines if the error correction term is positive (+) or negative 
(-). The second sign of the superscript represents whether the crude oil is raising (+) or falling (-). Entries 
represent the p-values from the F-test, where the null hypothesis represent a symmetric adjustment. Under 
the null, the coefficients are equal, meaning, same velocity towards the equilibrium. 
 
 
Table 11: LOG-GARCH Estimates 
 France 
𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝜎
𝑓𝑟𝑡
2 ) 
Germany 
𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝜎
𝑔𝑡
2 ) 
Spain 
𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝜎
𝑠𝑡
2 ) 
𝛼0 -0.015*** -0.105*** -0.738*** 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜖𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) 0.031* 0.157*** 0.093* 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) 0.949*** -0.393* -0.003 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠
𝑡
 -0.197*** -0.570*** -0.488** 
AIC -5.321 -5.993 -5.573 
BIC -5.218 -5.879 -5.482 
 
Note. “***”, “**” and “*” stand for significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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From the conditional variance models, we determine that the coefficient associated to 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠 is negative and statistically different from zero for any of the variance 
specifications. This implies that when input prices increase, the volatility of retail gasoline 
prices decreases. Thus, market participants may react in a coordinated way. Nevertheless, 
if crude oil prices decrease, there is higher price volatility since not all operators behave 
in the same manner. Some retailers will decrease prices more or less than others. This 
behaviour is consistent with collusive agreements. In the case that input cost increases 
everybody raises prices quickly to demonstrate its loyalty to the cartel members. 
However, in case of input price decreases, cartel members are more cautious in reducing 
prices, since this conduct could be understood as a deviation from the cartel agreement 
and could lead to a price war.  
From the nonlinear and asymmetric models some conclusions are drawn. With regard to 
the asymmetries in the mean, the French market may be more competitive due to the lack 
of asymmetries in the error correction term. This result is consistent with the outcomes 
arising from the models in the variance. It can be stated that France is much more volatile 
than the other two countries (Figure 7 and Figure 8). If the market is more competitive, 
output prices rapidly adjust to input price increases and decreases. 
Figure 7: Conditional Variance of the GARCH Models for France, Germany and Spain 
 
Note. The French conditional variance of the GARCH model is much volatile than in Germany or Spain. 
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Figure 8: Conditional Variance of the EGARCH Models for France, Germany and Spain 
 
Note. As in Figure 6, the French conditional variance of the EGARCH model is much volatile than in 
Germany or Spain. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the general consumer complaint that retail gasoline prices respond 
much faster to raises in crude oil prices than to reductions. It presents an international 
comparison of gasoline price behaviour by employing recent weekly data from January 
2011 until May 2017 for France, Germany and Spain.  
We show that allowing for asymmetries in variance reduces the degree of asymmetries in 
the conditional mean, as we can see by comparing the results of this paper with those of 
Escribano and Torrado (2018) where they only consider nonlinearities in the conditional 
mean. 
Furthermore, this paper studies how retail gasoline prices behave when modelling 
simultaneously nonlinear in the conditional mean and asymmetric specifications in 
variance. Most asymmetric ECMs have studied the rockets and feathers phenomenon 
through the conditional mean. Under this approach, not many asymmetries are found. 
Instead of studying asymmetries in the mean with the traditional asymmetric ECM, we 
use a double threshold model (DT-ECM) that considers whether international oil prices 
are above or below long-run equilibrium price levels and it accounts for positive or 
negative oil price changes as well.  
From the conditional mean specification, results show no asymmetries in France. 
However, asymmetries are found for Spain and Germany. Whenever retail gasoline prices 
for these two countries are below the long-run equilibrium level, the adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium is much faster when crude oil prices are increasing. Furthermore, 
Spain presents another type of asymmetry. When crude oil prices are decreasing, Spanish 
retail gasoline prices adjust quicker when they are above the long-run equilibrium level. 
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These asymmetries found for Spain and Germany could be explained by the presence of 
consumer search costs or the existence of market power. From the conditional variance 
models we determine that the asymmetries are statistically different from zero for any of 
the variance specifications. The best model for the variance, based on the information  
criteria (AIC, BIC and HQ) is the EGARCH with dummies. These models imply that 
when input (oil) prices increase, the volatility of retail gasoline prices decreases. Thus, 
market participants may react in a coordinated way (collusive behaviour). Nevertheless, 
if crude oil prices decrease, there is higher price volatility and not all operators behave in 
the same manner. Some retailers will decrease prices more than others. Again, this 
behaviour may corresponds with some collusive agreements. When the input cost (oil) 
increases, everybody raises prices quickly to demonstrate its loyalty to the cartel 
members. However, in case of input price decreases, cartel members are more cautious 
in reducing prices, since this conduct could be understood as a deviation from the cartel 
agreement and could lead to a price war.  
Therefore, our results show that French gasoline prices behave more competitively, 
adjusting much quickly to the long-run equilibrium and with higher price volatility. This 
outcome is consistent with the strong presence of hypermarkets following low cost 
pricing strategies in France. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note. The table reports variables in levels while the empirical models developed in Section 5 use the first 
differences of logarithms.  
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
Figure B-1: First Differences of the series in logarithms 
 
Note. Volatility clustering is present, with periods of higher volatility than others. 
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Figure B-2: Standardized Residuals from GARCH and EGARCH Models for France, Germany 
and Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
